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Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False
Claims for Off-Label Prescribing
Sandra H. Johnson**
Introduction
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug signals certification of
the drug’s safety and efficacy at least for those purposes, at the dosing level and for the
duration of use examined during the agency’s approval process. Some estimates,
however, indicate that over half of the prescription medications provided to patients in
the U.S. may be prescribed for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a longer period
of time, or for a population (such as children) different from that for which the drug has
been approved.1 This common practice, called “off-label” prescribing, has raised

*This article is based on the Inaugural Fallon-Friedlander Lecture in Health and Law delivered by the
author at the University of Chicago Law School in May 2006. The author is grateful for the helpful
comments of Richard Epstein, Mark Siegler, and David Meltzer on the lecture as well as Harold Edgar
(Columbia University), Kristin Madison (University of Pennsylvania) and my colleagues Jesse Goldner and
Tim Greaney on drafts of this article. Contact author at johnsosh@slu.edu Article will appear in Volume 9
of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology (December, 2007).
**Tenet Endowed Chair in Health Law and Ethics, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University
School of Law and Saint Louis University Department of Health Care Ethics; Professor of Law in Internal
Medicine, Saint Louis University School of Medicine; and Professor of Health Care Administration, Saint
Louis University School of Public Health.
1
David Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCH INT. MED. 1021
(2006), estimating that approximately 21% of prescriptions overall in the medical office setting were offlabel solely in terms of the indication or purpose for which the medication was prescribed, although some
categories of medications (specifically, cardiac medications and antihismatics for allergies) had much
higher rates, approaching or exceeding 50%). Off-label prescribing of medications for psychiatric
conditions appears to be higher than that for other medical conditions. See Hua Chen et al., Off-Label Use
of Antidepressant, Anticonfulxant, and Antipsychotic Medications Among Georgia Medicaid Enrollees in
2001, 67 J. CLIN. PSYCH. 972 (2006), reporting that 75% of prescriptions for antidepressants in the study
were for off-label uses as were 80% of prescriptions for anticonvulsant medications. See also Bernadette
Tansey, Hard Sell: How Marketing Drives the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Patient’s Right to Know: How
Much Should Doctors Disclose About Treatments Not Approved by the FDA?, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 1,
2005, at A1; Maxwell J. Mehlman, Off-Label Prescribing, http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/
articles/bioethics/offlabel_11/ (last visited October 2, 2006)(“[E]stimates [of off-label prescribing] run as
high as 60% of all drug prescriptions in the United States in a given year . . . “.); David M. Fritch, Speak No
Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech From
Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 315, n.219 (2005) (“One
estimate indicated off-label use accounted for 40–50% of the $216 billion spent on U.S. prescription drugs
in 2003.”). Cf. Megan Barnett, The New Pill Pushers: Big Pharma Watches Lawsuit Over ‘Off-Label’
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999418

significant concerns over the safety and efficacy of prescribed medications when they are
prescribed outside the scope of their approval. A study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) in May, 2006, sharpened these questions when it
reported that “most” off-label prescriptions studied had “little or no scientific support.”2
Certainly, concerns over the effectiveness or even the safety of such off-label
prescribing are significant, both for the health of individual patients and for the health of
the private and public health care budgets. The advent of the Medicare prescription drug
benefit has intensified the interest in the phenomenon of off-label prescribing and the
relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and practicing physicians.3 Actions
taken to constrain off-label prescribing in response to these increasing concerns,
however, face a serious risk of error. Counterintuitively, efforts to restrict off-label
prescribing categorically will harm individual patients, who will be denied medication
that may be uniquely effective though not yet definitively proven so, and upon patients
generally by seriously reducing medical innovation and “field discovery”4 of important
therapeutics.

Prescription Drug Marketing, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 26, 2004 (stating that about 23% of
prescriptions are for off-label uses).
2
Radley, supra note 1, at 1021.
3
Department of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care
Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, May 13, 2004, available at
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm, quoting the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services that fraud litigation directed at off-label marketing and prescribing “sends a strong
message in advance of the implementation of the Medicare prescription drug benefit.” See also, Gardiner
Harris, U.S. Weighs Not Paying for All Uses of Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004.
4
The off-label use of Neurontin, the subject of the litigation discussed in Part III of this article, for
neuropathic pain associated with shingles, was approved by the FDA in 2002 after years of off-label use for
this purpose. See infra, note 216 and accompanying text. Other notable examples of effective, expanded
uses discovered in the context of prescribing for off-label uses include the use of beta blockers for
preventive care post heart attack; the use of Viagra for erectile dysfunction; and the use of AZT for AIDS.
Jason K. Gross, Increased Governmental Inquiries Elevates Attorneys’ Importance to Pharmaceutical
Companies, 185 NEW J. L. J. 330 (2006). See also Harold J. DeMonaco et al., The Major Role of
Clinicians in the Discovery of Off-Label Drug Therapies, MIT Sloan Working Paper 4552-05, 3,
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/529167 (defining “field discovery” as new applications of drugs that
are discovered through “clinical practice that [is] independent of pharmaceutical company or university
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Questions concerning the exercise of medical judgment in off-label prescribing certainly
reflect rational concerns for individual patients, but they also reflect significant public
policy issues relating to oversight of medical decision making. Thus far, the dominant
public policy response to the phenomenon of off-label prescribing practices addresses the
issue as a particular breed of financial conflicts of interest in medicine.
This view constructs a narrative of off-label prescribing that sees the financial
relationships between pharmaceutical firms and practicing physicians as well as
researchers as a corrupting influence that pollutes medical judgment. The conflicts-ofinterest narrative of off-label prescribing mistakenly assumes that removing the
confounding financial self-interest of doctors will result in better decisions. In this purer
environment, off-label prescribing, it may be assumed, will be more rational, meaning
evidence-based, relying on the at least adequate information that will remain.
At best, the conflicts-of-interest narrative is only a partial accounting of the
phenomenon of off-label prescribing. At worst, the conflict-of-interest explanation of
off-label prescribing, standing alone, will mislead regulators because it relies on
untenable assumptions regarding the production and diffusion of clinical knowledge. In
either case, the conflicts-of-interest model cannot contribute to serious efforts to
prospectively and substantively control off-label prescribing.
Efforts to address off-label prescribing solely as a matter of conflicts of interest
may be important and may have some positive benefits (as well as negative effects), but
inevitably public and private regulators will be left with the conundrum that the conflictsof-interest approach dodges. Off-label prescribing decisions usually operate in the face
research.”); Stephen R. Solbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny
in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B. U. L. REV. 93, 96 (1999). See also discussion
of patients’ heterogeneity infra at note 60 and accompanying text.
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of serious gaps in research and knowledge. Efforts to seriously restrict this prescribing
will also operate without a firm evidentiary foundation for decision making and, thus,
will struggle with whether particular incidences or patterns of off-label prescribing are
“correct.”5 Furthermore, strident efforts to eliminate certain pharmaceutical industry
behaviors that create conflicts of interest may exacerbate this knowledge gap by both
depressing the production of clinical research and its assimilation into medical practice.
This paper argues that the core problem in off-labeling prescribing is not the
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and doctors, or at least not totally so.
Rather, the prevalence of off-label prescribing is a manifestation of patterns of learning in
the medical profession and deficiencies in the production and dissemination of clinical
knowledge. Furthermore, the fraud and abuse litigation strategy currently pursued by the
federal government to respond to industry-prescriber interactions around off-label
prescribing buries the essential problem in a conflicts-of-interest framework.
Part I of this article analyzes the impact of off-label prescribing patterns upon the
market demand for post-approval clinical trials. This Part concerns itself with how
physicians learn and how these learning patterns depress the production of new clinical
knowledge concerning drugs that have already been approved for release to the market
and thus are available for off-label prescribing. Post-approval trials, usually called postmarketing or Phase IV trials, are critical to the public health because of limitations in the

5

In fact, a significant gap in most research on industry influences on physician prescribing behavior is that
the studies that identify the direction of the influence (i.e., increasing prescribing or request for inclusion in
formularies) do not identify whether the change in prescribing produces better outcomes or otherwise
benefits patients. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE 160 (2006); Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating AcademicIndustrial Research Relationships – Solving Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1060
(2005). See discussion infra text accompanying note 25.
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testing performed during the drug approval process.6 In spite of the value of Phase IV
clinical trials, regulatory requirements for post-approval trials are nearly non-existent;
and the physician-prescriber market exerts only a weak demand for the production of
clinical research on approved drugs. Although demands for trials may be strengthening
among other players in the health care market, the physician- prescriber market is likely
to remain the core determinant of the volume of this research.
Part II of this article turns the lens and examines the character, quality and volume
of clinical research and its limited usefulness for clinical decision making. This Part
describes contemporary deficiencies in the production of clinical knowledge that impede
efforts by gatekeepers or regulators to move doctors, either by incentive or penalty,
toward a stronger reliance on scientific proof of efficacy for off-label prescriptions. This
Part also sets up a feedback loop between established patterns of physician learning and
the character of contemporary clinical research efforts by demonstrating how efforts to
control conflicts of interest in research, especially through disclosure, reinforce the
skepticism toward scientific research on the part of practicing physicians.

6

See discussion infra text accompanying notes 63-64. The FDA approval process for a new drug requires
clinical trials of the drug to test its safety and effectiveness. Generally, these trials proceed in three
“phases.” Phase I trials test the metabolic and pharmacological behaviors of the medication in a small
group of human subjects, typically between twenty and eighty persons, and are focused primarily on
assessing the risks of the drugs. Testing then proceeds to Phase II in which the drug is tested on a larger
group of subjects (generally 100 to 300 individuals) and on persons with the particular disease or condition
to which the medication is directed. Phase III trials generally are the largest of the trials conducted prior to
approval of a drug. Phase III trials usually require 1,000 to 3,000 subjects. Trials that are conducted after
or concurrently with the approval of the drug are usually called Phase IV trials. See W. Christopher Matton
& F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J.
283, 298 (2004) for a brief but clear description of the FDA new drug approval process, including clinical
trials. The number of individuals on which a drug is tested at a pre-approval stage has increased over the
years, from an average of 1,321 subjects in 1981-1984 to 4,237 in 1994-1995. Office of Inspector General,
HHS, Recruiting Human Subjects: Pressures in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, OEI-01-97-00195
(June 2000) at 12.

5

Finally, the article considers the strongest current regulatory effort to constrain
off-label prescribing at this time. In Part III, this article examines litigation efforts
targeted at financial relationships between doctors and pharmaceutical firms relating to
off-label prescribing, focusing on federal litigation under the False Claims Act over one
particular drug (Neurontin). This prosecution produced a settlement of over $455 million
and has spawned a significant body of copycat litigation efforts.7
This Part uses the Neurontin litigation, and its aftermath, to sharpen the critique of
the limits of conflicts-of-interest dominated approaches and to illustrate the information
constraints that challenge efforts to regulate off-label prescribing more directly.
Although the Neurontin litigation and similar cases are frequently taken as an illustration
of the centrality of conflicts of interest in the relationships among the pharmaceutical
industry, researchers and doctors; it is more richly studied for what it reveals about the
nature of clinical knowledge and clinical judgment. The litigation and its aftermath also
raise questions about the limited impact of this type of litigation on prescribing patterns
and illustrate the significant gap between controlling pharmaceutical-prescriber relations
through civil and criminal litigation and transforming that effort into prospective,
7

See infra text accompanying note 204. It remains the largest settlement to date for litigation focusing
solely to the marketing, educational, and research activities of a pharmaceutical firm relating to off-label
prescribing. Since that settlement, the government has aggressively pursued pharmaceutical firms for these
activities, gathering significant settlements. See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Schering-Plough to Pay $435 Million
Settlement, USATODAY, Aug. 30, 2006, 1B (reporting settlement of government claims of fraud for
promotion of off-label uses leading to submission of false claims against Medicaid as well as pricing
violations);, DOJ, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label Promotion (Dec.
21, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/05_civ_685.html; U.S. ex rel. Rost v.
Pfizer, 2006 WL 2501454 (D. Mass.), regarding off-label use of human growth hormone. See also Robert
Brady, et al., Crackdown on “Off-Label” Pitches, National Law Journal, March, 20 2006, S1, reporting on
settlements of actions against Serono for off-label promotion of a drug to treat AIDS wasting, as well as
other cases. Pharmaceutical companies have also filed suit over off-label promotion by competitors. See,
e.g., Off-Label Use: Zeneca, Maker of Nolvadex, Sues Eli Lilly for Claiming Evista Prevents Breast
Cancer, 8 BNA-HEALTH LAW REPORTER 392 (March 11, 1999). The impact of the False Claims Act
litigation for off-label promotion has also triggered private products liability class actions and suits by
private insurers to claim payments made for prescriptions for the drug. See infra notes 206-207.
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substantive control over prescribing. In addition, viewing the issues addressed in this
article through the lens of the Neurontin litigation grounds the analysis in today’s reality
of inadequate clinical research and limited efforts to disseminate new learning. As offlabel prescribing attracts more attention, it is critical that efforts to constrain the practice
not outpace the information and dissemination resources that currently exist.8
Part I: Weak Demand for Post-Marketing Clinical Research
Despite the extraordinary potential value of post-marketing clinical research for
approved drugs, in terms of continuing safety surveillance as well as broader testing of
effectiveness for both approved and unapproved purposes, the demand for post-marketing
studies is quite weak. A number of factors converge to create a weak demand for such
research. As discussed below, the legal framework for drug approval and for prescribing
encourages narrow approvals and resultant off-label prescribing. In addition, prescribing
physicians themselves do not create a strong demand for continuing research on approved
drugs in part because of learning patterns that tend to minimize the impact of published
studies and formal continuing medical education .

8

The advent of the electronic medical record and the resultant large-population databanks promise lower
cost post-approval research as the records can be mined for evidence of adverse effects as well as efficacy
for off-label prescriptions. Unfortunately, serious information problems will remain even in the brave new
information world. The data may be seriously inadequate for assessing health outcomes and may be
inaccurate. The databank may be proprietary to the payer, and the resultant analysis may also be so.
Finally, problems regarding creating adequate space for clinical innovation; access to unproven but
effective interventions; and the translation of averages to the individual patient will persist. See James
Walker, Electronic Medical Records and Health Care Transformation, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1118 (2005);
Clifford Goodman, Savings in Electronic Medical Record Systems: Do it For the Quality?, 24 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1124 (2005). One illustration of potential public-private information partnerships are those newly
established between the larger managed care organizations and federal agencies, including both the federal
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the FDA, which to this point focus almost solely on drug
safety issues. For analysis, see Kristin Madison, ERISA and Liability for Provision of Medical Information,
84 N.C. L. Rev. 471, 502-504 (2006), calling for effective accountability for MCO’s as medical
information providers. Whether or not these concerns about the usefulness of the research constructed
from the aggregation of patient records turn out to be well founded, these data sets are only now emerging.

7

State and federal law protect off-label prescribing. State liability standards, for
example, generally do not place the physician at significantly increased risk of liability
for off-label prescribing per se. Doctors are not subject to strict liability for prescribing a
medication off-label. In fact, off-label use often becomes the customary standard of care
in particular circumstances, with the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability
for failure to prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use. Furthermore, liability
standards typically allow a doctor to engage in off-label prescribing as a matter of
“clinical innovation” in attempting to treat individual patients, distinguishing this practice
from “experimentation,” and the heightened regulatory standards for informed consent
required of experimental protocols. Nor does state malpractice law generally require
specific disclosure by the physician to the patient that the particular prescribed use is offlabel.9
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)10 also respects off-label prescribing.
The Act, which requires that a drug be approved by the FDA before it is made available
to the market, essentially prohibits the FDA from circumscribing physician prescribing of
approved medications, including prescribing that differs in indication, population, dose or
duration from those approved by the FDA.11 Under the FDCA, the FDA has no authority
to “limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe” an

9

For an overview of liability risks for off-label prescribing, see Mehlman, supra note 1. But see
Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (court held that the fact that a drug use was offlabel could be introduced as evidence that the prescribing physician deviated from the standard of care).
Pharmaceutical firms have been found liable for injuries related to off-label uses when they have actively
promoted those uses and concealed adverse effects. Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1997).
10
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
11
The FDA, however, does regulate pharmaceutical firms’ behavior in relation to promoting off-label uses.
The FDA prohibits pharmaceutical firms from marketing drugs for off-label uses, but allows companies to
engage in limited educational and research efforts related to off-label prescribing. The limitations on firm
behavior in relation to promotion of off-label uses are discussed below, in the context of the Neurontin
litigation.
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approved medication within the context of a legitimate physician-patient relationship.12
The intention of this provision is to avoid federal interference with the practice of
medicine,13 a somewhat quaint notion at this point but alive in this situation
nonetheless.14
Federal drug law, however, does more than merely respect off-label prescribing.15
The design of the FDCA actually encourages the proliferation of off-label uses and a high
frequency of off-label prescribing. Because a drug approved for a particular purpose is
then available to the prescribing physician for any purpose, the regulatory structure
incentivizes pharmaceutical firms to seek a narrow approved use, at least initially, in
order to minimize the delay to market and reduce the investment in research required to
meet FDA standards for approval.16 The FDA only rarely requires post-approval clinical
trials as a condition of approval,17 and the agency’s follow up on required trials has been
uneven.18 Even though there is a simplified approval process for expanded uses of
12

21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000).
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
14
See generally Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149 (2004).
15
Of course, the federal government has other interests, and perhaps countervailing policies and authority
as the largest payer of drugs, including off-label prescriptions. As will become apparent in the later
discussion of the Neurontin litigation, these interests have not operated as a significant prospective
counterweight to the incentives in the FDCA regulatory structure. See discussion infra text accompanying
notes 220-45.
16
Mitchell Oates, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through Production and Disclosure of
Research Into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1280 (2005).
17
The FDA may require post-marketing clinical trials in two circumstances: first, if the drug was approved
under the fast-track provision for getting drugs to market in the case of life-threatening diseases; second, in
the rarest cases where testing a drug on human beings is unethical, the FDA requires testing when
circumstances make such testing feasible and ethical. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2000) and 21 C.F.R. §
314.610(b)(1) (2002). In addition, the FDA may require post-marketing clinical trials where testing is
needed to assure that particular drugs used by a substantial number of children are safe and effective for
pediatric use. 21 U.S.C. 355(c) (2000). FDA regulations do provide for post-marketing surveillance,
requiring that the manufacturer report any new information concerning safety and efficacy periodically.
These regulations, however, do not require that the drug be submitted to formal clinical trials.
Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/Postmarketing/
surveillancepost.htm (last visited October 8, 2006).
18
A 2006 GAO study reported that generally the agency’s postmarketing surveillance system suffered from
a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight, and a lack of clear criteria for decisions. In addition, the GAO
13

9

already approved drugs,19 regulatory incentives to invest in expanded approval are
uneven at best.20
Of course, the market could provide incentives for continuing research on
approved drugs despite weak regulatory mandates. If physicians in practice refused to
prescribe drugs beyond the use, duration, population or dosage for which they have been
approved, firms would be incentivized by the prescriber market to seek broader approval
expeditiously. The frequency and breadth of off-label prescribing, however, provide
strong inferential evidence that doctors do not regard FDA approval as a necessary
indicator of effectiveness (e.g., when they prescribe for an unapproved use) and perhaps
even safety (e.g. when they prescribe at unapproved dosages or durations or for
significantly distinct populations on which the drug has not been tested). In view of the
serious constraints of the formal approval process, at least in terms of the time lag and the
capacity of the FDA, a practice of awaiting formal approval for each indication is
impractical; may harm patients; and actually may violate the standard of care in particular

criticized the FDA’s follow up on postmarketing trials that it had required. GAO, Improvement Needed in
FDA’s Postmarket Decision-Making and Oversight Process (March 2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf . The problems extend to medical device issues as well as
pharmaceuticals. See FDA Briefing Addresses Problems in Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance
System (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=35193.
19
Oates, supra note 16, at 1285.
20
See, e.g., Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002), which
created incentives for testing approved drugs in children in terms of extension of patent protection for those
drugs. The intersection of patent law with the FDCA diminishes incentives for seeking approval of
expanded uses of an approved drug. In the context of Neurontin, for example, it is possible that approval of
expanded uses was not sought because of the anticipated expiration of the patent protection of the drug.
Department of Justice, supra note 3. Revenue from sales of Neurontin fell 77% when patent protection
expired. Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, Pfizer, Inc. (March 7, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR
4302915. Of course, the FDCA limitation on promotion of approved drugs for off-label uses targeted to
physician-prescribers could create an incentive for seeking approval, but ordinarily doesn’t do so, as
described below. See discussion infra accompanying notes 22-23. The emergence of pre-emption of state
products liability claims for drugs that are prescribed as approved may create an incentive for seeking
formal approval of expanded uses, but it is too early to tell.
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circumstances. The practice of off-label prescribing, then, would seem to be a rational
reaction to the limitations of the formal approval process.21
While prohibiting off-label prescribing by requiring formal FDA approval for
every indication, dose, duration of therapy, and population for which an approved drug
may be prescribed is impractical, practicing doctors could instead as a general rule refrain
from prescribing medications until they are at least proven effective and safe, even if not
formally approved, for the particular prescription contemplated. One may argue that the
practice of medicine, to the extent that it relies on a scientific model of knowledge, would
demand no less than substantial proof of safety and effectiveness prior to off-label
prescribing. If doctors did so, pharmaceutical firms would confront a strong market
demand for post-marketing clinical trials,22 and the weakness of the regulatory
requirements for post-marketing research would become less significant.

21

Some have argued that these limitations in the drug approval process argue in favor of dismantling the
entire system. See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein and Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, REG., June 1,
2004, at 60.
22
Of course, doctors are not the only gatekeepers for prescribed drugs. Most health plans and
pharmaceutical benefit management programs, however, do little to confine off-label prescribing, although
they are actively engaged in significant efforts to influence physician and patient demand on other fronts,
including, for example, shifting from expensive to less expensive substitute formulations (“fail first”
requirements) or to generic drugs or creating tiered benefits or increased co-pays or requiring
preauthorization, or, in the case of Medicaid programs simply limiting the number of prescription drugs
that will be reimbursed for each patient, among other methods. Soumerai, supra note 22, describing these
methods; J.D. Kleinke, Access Versus Excess: Value-Based Cost Sharing for Prescription Drugs, 23
HEALTH AFFAIRS 34, 42 (2004), noting that the private insurance sector has “mostly abandoned” the
“command-and-control . . . and other first-generation management strategies” for pharmaceuticals. See
also, Rachel Christensen Seithi, Prescription Drugs: Recent Trends in Utilization, Expenditures, and
Coverage, Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 265 (January 2004),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0104ib.pdf, reporting on a general decline in the number of employers
using substantive controls. See also, the discussion of Medicaid coverage policy infra notes 182-190 and
220-240 and accompanying text. Consumer behavior also can create an incentive for postmarketing
research and formal approval of an approved drug for an off-label indication as FDA approval for the offlabel use is required if the firms want to advertise directly to consumers. Direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertising of prescription medications increases requests by patients for specific prescriptions, but there is
a large gap between request and prescribing. While one survey found that approximately 35% of patients
had discussed an advertised drug with their doctor, a 2002 GAO study reported that only 5% of consumers
had both requested and received a prescription for a particular drug that had been the subject of DTC
advertising. Seithi, supra note 22; GAO, FDA Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Has
Limitations (October 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03177.pdf.
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Practicing physicians, in fact, do not exert a high demand for convincing scientific
proof of effectiveness for off-label uses. They do not create a robust market for
scientifically valid information on effectiveness or even safety.23
The conflicts-of-interest narrative of off-label prescribing implies that doctors’
prescribing is simply purchased by the pharmaceutical industry through free lunches,
office supplies, travel, speaker’s fees, and other more extravagant gifts.24

While the

“doctor for sale” story may be true as far as it goes,25 a fuller appreciation of physician
prescribing behavior requires examining how physicians actually do learn to alter their
practices, in this case to establish a new prescribing pattern for particular conditions.
The literature on physician learning belies the common view of the practice of
medicine as bounded by science. In fact, one student of physician learning observed that
doctors “have a deep skepticism about clinical trials, from a belief that clinical
experience, rather than the scientific evidence should govern clinical practice.”26 High
valuation of experience27 over studies permeates the observed learning patterns of

23

Radley, supra note 1, at 1021.
Troy Brennan, et al., A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252
(2003); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283
JAMA 373 (2000).
25
See discussion of lack of outcomes research in the conflicts of interest literature supra note 5.
26
Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician Motivations for Nonscientific Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 577 (1989), as quoted in Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, at footnote 205 (2002).
27
Even physicians who report that they always or often use evidence-based medicine in making practice
decisions rely instead most heavily on clinical experience. Ninety-three percent of physicians in one study
reported relying on clinical experience as an information source, and the rate of reliance did not differ
substantially between the group reporting commitment to evidence-based medicine and the group that only
sometimes or rarely/never utilized EBM in their practice. Finlay A. McAlister, et al., Evidence-Based
Medicine and the Practicing Clinician, 14 J. OF GEN. INT. MED. 236 (1999). Reliance on clinical
experience may be dangerous, of course. A study of data on the impact of clinical experience, in terms of
years of practice concluded that, in fact, experience may have an inverse impact on health outcomes,
compliance with screening recommendations, and information base for prescribing. Niteesh K. Choudhry,
et al., Systematic Review: The Relationship Between Clinical Experience and Quality of Health Care, 142
ANNALS INT. MED. 260 (2005).
24
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practicing physicians, including the surprisingly limited influence of published studies
and the relative ineffectiveness of didactic continuing medical education.
Peer-reviewed journals are the gold standard for the publication of rigorous
medical and scientific research; and journal articles do exert some influence on specific
treatment decisions, but not nearly as much as one might anticipate. One researcher on
physician decision making, for example, has noted that “the universal skepticism of
practicing physicians regarding the utility of the scientific literature is startling.”28
There is also evidence that even when physicians do review professional journals
for relevant information for clinical decision making that they are likely to fail to
distinguish between rigorous studies and preliminary studies;29 may be limited in their
ability to assess the strength of any particular study;30 and may in fact rely excessively on
abstracts, overlooking instances in which the abstract may overstate results.31 In
addition, critics of peer-reviewed journals as a source of guidance for clinical decision
making have noted that journals are not focused on the practitioner and often mix reports
of a few rigorous trials with many preliminary studies, making it difficult for the
practitioner (who may skip the methodology section) to be discriminating in evaluating
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Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the Science: The Diffusion of New
Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 5, 9 (1988), as quoted
in Noah, supra note 26 at footnote 205. See also H.B. Slotnick, How Doctors Learn: Physicians’ Selfdirected Learning Episodes, 74 ACADEMIC MEDICINE, 1106, 1110 (1999) (When addressing specific, acute
needs, doctors tend to rely on readily available literature and discussions with colleagues. They are more
likely to refer to medical journals for guidance in addressing general problems.)
29
R.B. Haynes, Loose Connections Between Peer-Reviewed Clinical Journals and Clinical Practice, 113
ANN. INT. MED. 724 (1990).
30
Only 34% of physician respondents in one survey reported that they had confidence in their ability to
evaluate the methodology of a study on their own, and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search.
McAlister, supra note 27.
31
One study of how residents learn, for example, observed that even the “librarian residents,” a term used
to describe those residents who reported reading as a source of information, were most likely to read only
the abstracts and conclusions of articles. Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell, Evidence-Based Medicine,
Clinical Uncertainty, and Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 342, 345–47 (2001).
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the quality of information.32 Physicians also may be equally influenced by letters and
case reports published in journals, which can be merely anecdotal, as by sound scientific
studies.33 The reliance on anecdotal, informal reports is consistent with observations of a
higher trust level for clinical experience over clinical trials.
Written clinical guidelines standing alone also have proven relatively ineffective
in changing practice patterns.34 While the lack of influence for clinical guidelines may be
attributed simply to physician resistance to “cookbook medicine,” the more intractable
problem is the quality of most clinical guidelines. For example, guidelines frequently
produce only the most general guidance in part because of the dearth of clinical research
required to ground more specific, and perhaps more influential, guidelines.35 Thus,
guidelines often must rely extensively on “expert opinion” or consensus (a.k.a.
committee) efforts rather than data. Further, to the extent that specific guidelines rely on
the aggregation of published research studies, they may simply incorporate biases in that
literature.36
Perhaps because of their trust of experience over controlled studies, doctors may tend
to rely on opinions of respected peers and opinion leaders within the profession rather
than on clinical studies or clinical guidelines standing alone. Deference to “group think”
and to a hierarchy of opinion may be a learned pattern of decision making adopted in the
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Haynes, supra note 29.
In one survey doctors reported both that they referred to “review articles” in journals (73%) but that they
did not refer to “research studies” (55%). McAlister, supra note 27.
34
See, e.g., James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies:Can They Improve Emergency Department
Pain Management?, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 783 (2005).
35
See generally Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in
the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002), for an in-depth discussion of practice guidelines.
See also Sean R. Tunis, et. al, Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for
Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1625 (2003).
36
Kleinke, supra note 22, at 36, detailing the impact of bias in the development of guidelines for the use of
pharmaceuticals.
33
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doctor’s experience of residency training where the opinion of the attending physician is
revered as authoritative.37 Studies document significant influence of peer opinions on
clinical decision making,38 although some studies conclude that the context for the
transmission of opinions may make a difference in effect on practice.39
Documentation of wide variations in medical practice patterns corroborates the
reported reliance on peers and opinion leaders as these same studies on practice
variations reveal practice homogeneity as well.40 One might expect that if physicians
relied on scientific research results for medical decision making, neither the variations
among regions nor the homogeneity within regions would be so pronounced.
Journals are not the only tool for formal learning in medical practice, of course.
Continuing medical education (CME) is so highly valued as a vehicle for updating
clinical knowledge that it is a routine licensure requirement for practicing physicians and
is often used as a rehabilitative mechanism in physician discipline.41 CME, however, is
largely ineffective in achieving its ultimate goal of improving practice.42
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Timmermans, supra note 31, at 345–47.
See, e.g., Jane M. Young, et al., Role for Opinion Leaders in Promoting Evidence-Based Surgery, 138
ARCH. SURG. 785 (2003), reporting that 88% of surgeons surveyed agreed that they had colleagues who
would be influential in altering their own practice, and 93.8% reported that clinical opinion leaders in
surgery were very or somewhat likely to influence their practice patterns. Surgeons reported that opinion
leaders were more influential than clinical audits or clinical practice guidelines. At the same time,
however, surgeons in this survey reported that peer-reviewed surgical literature influenced their practice as
well.
39
At least one study indicates that the influence of opinion leaders varies along the same lines as the
influence of continuing medical education described below. A. Wadhwa, et al., A Qualitative Study of
Interphysician Telephone Consultations: Extending the Opinion Leader Theory, 25 J. CONTIN. EDUC.
HEALTH PROF. 98 (2005).
40
The classic studies on interregional variations and intraregional homogeneities in practice were done by
John E. Wennberg. See, e.g., Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 6 (1984). See also K. McPherson, et al., Small-Area Variations in the Use of Common Surgical
Procedures: An International Comparison of New England, England, and Norway, 21 NEW ENG. J. MED.
307, 1310–1314 (1982). The studies on interregional heterogeneity and local homogeneity of surgical
practice may contradict survey data of surgeons’ self-reported higher reliance on peer-reviewed literature
(94%) than on local colleagues (89.3%). Id.
41
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2190; MO. REV. STAT. § 330.160. See also David A. Davis, et al.,
Accuracy of Physician Self-Assessment Compared With Observed Measures of Competence: A Systematic
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A significant study analyzing empirical studies of the impact of CME on practice
decision making concluded that studies consistently demonstrated that formal, didactic
CME exerts only a weak effect on practice patterns.43 Lecture and case-based CMEs,
which are the custom of the trade, can change information levels but do not change
practice. The authors of this article found that traditional didactic CME “has little or no
role to play” in changing practice.44 A later analysis confirmed this conclusion and noted
that such programs “have little or no beneficial effect in changing physician practice.”45
Doctors absorb new information, but do not necessarily incorporate it into their decision
making.
Some CME pedagogies can effect change in practice.46 In particular, multiple
contacts between instructor and student following a learn-work-learn sequence;
information provided at the point of an expressed need to know; comparative information
on the practice of other physicians; enabling materials that assist in interactions with
patients (such as patient education sheets, reminders, and such); mailed materials
followed up with personal phone calls; and proctoring and shadowing all show more

Review, 296 JAMA 1094 (2006) (describing CME requirements of state medical licensure bodies, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the specialty boards, and others).
42
A recent review of the role of CME in improving physician practices concludes that physicians do not
accurately assess their own learning needs and that efforts to improve physician competency through
continuing education will need to develop other tools to do so. Id. at 1094.
43
David Davis, et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education, 282 JAMA 867 (1999). The
results of this study were confirmed by a later analysis reported in B.S. Bloom, Effects of Continuing
Medical Education on Improving Clinical Care and Patient Health: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 21
INT’L J. TECHNOL. ASSESS. HEALTH CARE 380 (2005). See also W. Sohn, et al., Efficacy of Educational
Interventions Targeting Primary Care Providers’ Practice Behaviors: An Overview of Published
Systematic Reviews, 64 J. PUB. HEALTH DENT. 164 (2004).
44
Davis, supra note 43, at 873.
45
Bloom, supra note 43.
46
A 2004 article, for example, reported that an “interactive, case-based, educational intervention . . . using
a series of interactive case-based teleconferences” effected a change in prescribing for asthma even though
clinical guidelines recommending such prescribing had been ineffective in changing practice in over ten
years. R.S. Davis, et al., Changing Physician Prescribing Patterns Through Problem-Based Learning, 93
ANN. ALLERGY ASTHMA IMMUNOL. 237 (2004). See also Paul E. Mazmanian & David A. Davis,
Continuing Medical Education and the Physician as a Learner, 288 JAMA 1057 (2002).
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significant effects than the standard CME.47 Most CME, however, is the “standard
CME,”48 while most pharmaceutical detailing (one-on-one representative-physician
marketing) utilizes the very same pedagogical methods that have been documented as
effective in changing practice in the CME context. In fact, although survey data indicates
that practicing physicians are skeptical about scientific studies, a Kaiser Family
Foundation survey of doctors found that 74% thought information provided by drug
representatives was useful and 81% believed that the information was at least somewhat
accurate.49 Of course, this may be due to the “free lunch” that comes with the
information,50 but it may also be due to the more effective pedagogical methods -methods that are responsive to clinical practice -- used in this form of CME.
Once established, or once learned, practice and prescribing patterns are hard to alter.
Some studies of off-label prescribing reveal habitual patterns among a significant
segment of physicians.51 Habit may persist even when serious safety concerns emerge.
For example, while changes in drug labeling regarding warnings of previously unknown,
serious risks are often mailed or faxed directly to physicians, studies indicate that these
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Davis, supra note 43, at 870-871. See also F. Daniel Duffy & Eric S. Holmboe, Self-assessment in
Lifelong Learning and Improving Performance in Practice, 296 JAMA 1137, 1138 (2006) (discussing the
importance of self-identified learning needs as motivational tools for more effective CME).
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Bloom, supra note 43.
49
Kaiser Family Foundation, National Survey of Physicians Part II: Doctors and Prescription Drugs (2002)
available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/20020415b-index.cfm.
50
See, e.g., Troy Brennan, Health Industry Practices That Create a Conflict of Interest, 295 JAMA 429
(2006); Dana Katz, All Gifts Large and Small, 3 AJOB 39 (2003); Wazana, supra note 24, reporting on
studies that document increased prescribing associated with pharmaceutical gifts; a positive disposition
toward drug representatives; an increase in physician requests to add a specific drug to the hospital’s or
insurer’s formulary in association with gifting; and doctors’ inability to distinguish grounded from
ungrounded claims. These studies do not measure patient outcomes subsequent to prescribing changes,
however. Studies of the influence of pharmaceutical detailing do not analyze its impact on patient
outcomes. Wazana, supra note 24, at 378. Furthermore, some studies recognize specific positive effects,
including “improved ability to identify the treatment for complicated illnesses.” Id.
51
See, e.g., Judith K. Hellerstein, The Demand for Post-Patent Prescription Pharmaceuticals (December
1994). NBER Working Paper No. W4981. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226580. See also
discussion of Neurontin prescribing patterns, infra, text accompanying notes 209-213.
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mailings “do not result in changes in prescribing practice . . . that physicians frequently
prescribed drugs in violation of warnings, including black box warnings.”52 Of course,
part of the paradox in drug approval and post-marketing surveillance is evident in the
case of black box warnings in which the particular medication is not removed from the
market, but physicians are to be “cautious” in prescribing because of risks discovered
post-approval. There may be good reasons for a doctor to continue prescribing a drug
with a black box warning because it is more effective for the particular patient and that
gain in effectiveness outweighs the newly discovered risks. Thus, continued prescribing
of medication with a black box warning in a particular case may be evidence of
inappropriate habitual prescribing, or it may be an exercise of appropriate medical
judgment.53
Why are practicing doctors more likely to emulate their peers in their practice
decisions, to look to physician opinion leaders, and to trust experience rather than to rely
52

Jerry H. Gurwitz, Serious Adverse Drug Effects – Seeing the Trees Through the Forest, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1413 (2006.) Black box warnings are the most severe warnings the FDA can issue for a drug that is
to remain on the market despite newly discovered adverse effects. See also KE Lasser, Adherence to Black
Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 3, 33844 (2006) (reporting that doctors studied prescribed medications subject to black box warnings to 7 of 1000
outpatients, with female patients and patients over 75 years old more likely to receive the medications; that
fewer than 1% of patients who received such drugs had an adverse drug event; and that “few incidents
resulted in detectable harm.”); AK Wagner, FDA Drug Prescribing Warnings: Is the Black Box Half Empty
or Half Full?, 15 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY AND DRUG SAFETY 6, 369-86 (2006)(reporting that 40% of
patients studied received a medication subject to a black box warning applicable to their situation,
including some specifically applicable to pregnancy and that most of the non-compliance observed
involved the absence of baseline laboratory monitoring that should have accompanied the drug therapy).
53
See e.g., American Medical Association, Report 10 on the Council of Scientific Affairs (A-05): Safety
and Efficacy of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) in Children and Adolescents (2005)
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15186.html: “[The AMA] recognizes that the
current product labeling (package insert) of antidepressant drugs, including the Black Box warnings, is a
precautionary statement intended to reinforce the need for careful monitoring of patients with depression
and other psychiatric disorders during the initiation of treatment. This product labeling should not be
interpreted in a way that would decrease access for patients who may benefit from these drugs.” This
became AMA policy H-115.971 Safety and Efficacy of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) in
Children and Adolescents, available at http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-115.971.HTM. After reviewing the
evidence, the AMA concluded that the association between the antidepressants and rates of suicide was not
supported by data. AMA asks FDA to Study Impact of Antidepressant Labeling Changes. AMA Science
News. Available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15240.html.

18

on published scientific studies or formal FDA approval? To some extent, physicians are
simply employing common coping skills to manage the information environment of
modern medical practice. The amount of medical information available to a physician is
overwhelming; for example, Medline adds 30,000 citations to its database each month.54
Although Medline and other medical research databases are searchable, doctors report a
low confidence level in their ability to do a literature search on a particular question.55
Learning preferences and information preferences are common coping tools for massive
amounts of information.56
Similarly, informal communication networks among peers can transmit
information much more quickly than peer-reviewed journals can.57 Especially in certain
practice areas, including oncology for example, the demand for speed may outpace the
demand for scientific verification (for example, through completion of ongoing but
incomplete clinical trials) of the quality of information that is being shared.58
Furthermore, information gathered from peers comes with an interpretative framework of
experience, which is valued in medicine.59
We also see in these learning preferences a construct of patients as highly variable
and medical practice as highly intuitive and reliant on judgment or discretion. The
averages produced in scientific studies will not necessarily account for the individual
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McAlister, supra note 27.
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patient presenting to the individual physician. The problem of heterogeneity extends to
individualized responses to medications.60
Finally, in a tradition-oriented profession like medicine (like most professions),
there is safety in the herd. Malpractice and professional disciplinary standards, to the
extent that they compare an individual doctor’s decisions to a national or community
custom, reinforce this learning pattern by rewarding those who assure that their practice
is within the mainstream. In some instances, regulatory agencies have used departure
from majority prescribing practices as indicia of criminal or licensure violations.61
The observed skepticism of scientific studies as essential supports for prescribing
may reflect patterns of learning and practice that are simply resistant to scientific
evidence no matter what the quality of information available. Reliance on peers and peer
practices may also respond to ineffective dissemination of knowledge through other
outlets, including both journal articles and continuing medical education programs. In
addition to these considerations, deficiencies in the production and quality of clinical
knowledge, which are discussed in the next section, may actually reinforce clinicians’
skepticism of the utility of research studies in their prescribing decisions.
Part II: The Limited Utility of Clinical Research for Off-Label Prescribing Decisions
If off-label uses of an approved medication are to be tested at all, those tests, by
definition, will be conducted after the drug is approved for the market. As discussed
earlier, the FDA does not ordinarily require significant post-marketing clinical research
as a condition of approval of a particular drug, even though it has some authority to do
60

Heterogeneity is a particular problem in the responsiveness of patients to particular medications, both in
terms of effectiveness and adverse effects. Soumerai, supra note 22, at 143. See also, EPSTEIN, supra note
5, 118-120.
61
See, e.g., Symposium: Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing the Clinical, Legal, and
Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. Med. & Ethics 285-364 (1996).
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so. Furthermore, prescribing doctors do not exert strong market demand for postmarketing research for off-label prescribing. Weak demand for post-marketing research,
both through regulatory channels and in the prescribing market,62 has produced an
insufficient supply of clinical knowledge for off-label prescribing. This gap exists not
only in the case of non-approved uses but also the perhaps even more common incidents
of off-label prescribing relating to the use of approved medications for patient
populations on which the drug has not been tested and where there may be significant
disparities in effectiveness and safety (e.g., certain drugs tested only on men but
prescribed for women and drugs tested only on adults but prescribed for children) and use
of medications for doses or for durations (e.g., long-term instead of short-term) that have
not been tested in clinical trials prior to approval.
Off-label prescribing is not unique in raising the issue of insufficient clinical
research. The insufficiency in the production of Phase IV clinical trials extends to all
prescribing, including both off-label prescribing and prescribing within the scope of
approval. These studies typically will be the first in which very large numbers of persons
are studied. For comparison, Phase III trials, the largest of the pre-approval trials,
ordinarily involve only 1,000 to 3,000 people, a number that is too small to reveal
uncommon though quite serious adverse effects. In addition, the pre-approval trials are
time-limited, while post-marketing trials can extend for a much longer time, again
increasing the likelihood that adverse events that arise only with very long-term use will
be detected. In addition, pre-approval trials generally rely on a “naïve” subject
population, one that will not present the risk of drug interactions because these
interactions may confound the results for the tested drug. Once available for prescribing,
62

See Part II supra.

21

however, the approved drug will be used by patients taking any number of other
medications; and so, Phase IV trials often present the first opportunity for testing the risks
of drug interactions. Equally importantly, approved medications are prescribed for
individuals, including both the elderly and children as well as individuals with medical
conditions such as diabetes, in whom the medication may behave quite differently in
terms both of effect and safety. These differences are likely to be detected only in the
postmarketing phase of research.63 Finally, the FDA does not require proof of
comparative efficacy for approval of a new medication, and so trials that compare one
drug to another usually take place, if at all, only after a new medication has been
approved.64
The insufficiency in clinical trials occurs both in terms of the volume of this
research as well as in its quality. Understanding the sources of inadequacies in
contemporary clinical research for the needs of clinical practice emerges from an
examination of the funding for clinical research (and the presumed impact of that
funding) as well as limitations in the design of clinical trials.
Randomized clinical trials are expensive. In fact, the larger number of subjects
and longer lifespan of Phase IV trials make them particularly expensive. The
pharmaceutical industry is not the only source of financing for post-marketing clinical
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DeMonaco, supra note 4.
Those comparative studies currently conducted can suffer from design flaws relating to whether the
appropriate dosage is chosen for the comparable and other issues. K.J. Jørgensen, et al., Flaws in Design,
Analysis and Interpretation of Pfizer's Antifungal Trials of Voriconazole and Uncritical Subsequent
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research; it’s just the biggest by far.65 The federal National Institutes of Health (NIH) has
been expanding its commitment to clinical research of late, but currently spends only
30% of its budget (approximately $850 million) on pharmaceutical clinical trials of all
types, including Phase I, II, III as well as Phase IV trials.66 The federal Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) spends approximately $30 million annually on
clinical trials, although again not only Phase IV trials.67 The Veterans’ Administration
has conducted some significant trials of medical interventions, but its budget for such
research is only approximately $55 million per year, and again not devoted entirely to
pharmaceutical research.68 The Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics, a
joint FDA-AHRQ effort aimed at improving the production of clinical knowledge, has an
annual budget of $7 million to support clinical trials of drugs.69 The Medicare program
has also begun to “fund” clinical research studies on its own beneficiaries through a
condition on payment for “experimental” interventions.70 In comparison to the
approximately $950 million of federal money devoted to all phases of clinical trials,
pharmaceutical firms spend $4.1 billion on such research, over four times the government
expenditure. Of that, about $410 million is spent on Phase IV trials alone.71 While
private insurers and pharmacy benefits management programs are beginning an effort to
65

EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 145, analyzing data on marketing expenditures and relating those to clinical
trial expenditures.
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D.G. Nathan & H.E. Varmus, The National Institutes of Health and Clinical Research: A Progress
Report, 6 NAT’L MED. 1201 (2000).
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AHRQ, Center for Education and Research on Therapeutics, available at
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POL’Y, L. & ETHICS, forthcoming. See also, discussion of data collection by private insurers, supra note 8.
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produce clinical research on approved drugs, this effort is in its infancy and currently is
confined largely to collecting data from the pharmaceutical industry itself.72 Even if this
effort increases, the information produced may be viewed as proprietary.
Pharmaceutical industry support for research, so essential to the production of
clinical knowledge in the face of limited public funding, has raised substantial concerns,
as described in Part I of this article. The interesting, vigorous and disturbing debate over
industry support of clinical trials challenges the credibility of clinical research on which
clinical, management, and regulatory decisions, at least theoretically, should rely.
Furthermore, the current credibility crisis may have a nonspecific but pervasive effect on
the uptake of clinical research results into medical practice, especially when fed into a
model of physician learning and decision making that is already skeptical of the
usefulness of scientific studies.73 Finally, the quality of clinical research certainly limits
its utility for regulatory and private controls over physician prescribing. If clinical
studies are biased, then public and private efforts to control prescribing rely on defective
information.74
In January 2003, Bekelman and colleagues published a watershed article on the
impact of funding source on results of research.75 In this article, they performed a meta-
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analysis of 37 published quantitative studies that compared the source of funding with the
outcomes of 1140 biomedical studies, many of which were drug studies.76 Bekelman’s
study thus examined the aggregation of data over several studies of single drugs or other
medical interventions.77 Bekelman and colleagues concluded that the sponsorship of a
study was very closely associated with the outcome reported, even in the case of random
controlled trials. The authors concluded that:
Strong and consistent evidence shows that industry-sponsored research
tends to draw pro-industry conclusions. . . . [W]e found that industrysponsored studies were significantly more likely to reach conclusions
that were favorable to the sponsor than were nonindustry studies.78
The pattern of “pro-industry conclusions,” as the authors termed the phenomenon, was
pronounced in several instances.79 For example, studies of the results of articles on
calcium channel blockers reported that 51% of authors with industry funding reported
positive results in trials of the drugs, while 0% of authors of studies that were not
sponsored by interested firms reported positive results.80 Other studies showed less
dramatic differences, but a difference of 20% was most common when comparing the
rate of positive and negative outcomes over the aggregated studies of particular drugs or
other interventions.81
It is indicative of this time of turmoil in clinical research that it’s not clear where
the blame lies for the observed bias in studies reviewed, accepted, and published in
medical journals. Does the association of sponsorship with positive results reflect bias on
Bhandari, et al., Association Between Industry Funding and Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings
in Medical and Surgical Randomized Trials, 170 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 4, 477–480; Lexchin, supra note
64.
76
See Bekelman, supra note 75, at 456.
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Id.
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Id.
80
Id. at 456.
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Id. at 458.
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the part of the industry-funded researcher, influencing the researcher’s collection and
analysis of data?82 Or, is the bias the result of the pharmaceutical firms’ selectivity in
choosing to fund only studies with a high likelihood of positive outcome, thereby
strengthening the market for their product?83 Or, is the observed bias in the literature
produced by research contracts or grants in which the sponsor retains the unilateral right
to release results for publication or not, allowing the sponsor to control the flow of
information through the journals to the medical market?84 Or, is it possible that the
journals themselves contribute to selection bias by rejecting studies that “show that a new
treatment is inferior to standard treatment” or “that are neither clearly positive nor clearly
negative.”85
Of course, any one of these reasons casts doubt on the reliability not only of a
single published article, but even more significantly on the entire body of published
82
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research about a particular drug. Systemic bias has serious implications for the
aggregation of published results. Such aggregation of results is often the foundation for
the “evidence” for evidence-based medicine – for practice guidelines and consensus
statements for treatment decisions.86 If published results, in the aggregate, show a bias
toward “pro-industry” conclusions, the disutility of published clinical trials becomes
apparent, raising issues not only for the practicing physician but also for any gatekeeper,
governmental or private, that aims at controlling individual prescribing decisions by
reference to published clinical studies.
The Bekelman piece is only an example of the mounting concern over bias in
published clinical studies. In the four years since this watershed analysis, the trickle of
concern over the validity and purity of research results published in the gold standard
peer-reviewed journals has grown into a torrent.87 In a summer 2006, editorial, Dr.
Catherine DeAngelis, the editor-in-chief of JAMA, identifies a litany of examples of
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“research irregularities” in research sponsored by “for-profit companies.”88 These
examples include “refusal to provide all study data to the study team, reporting only 6
months of data in a trial designed to have 12 months of data . . .; incomplete reporting of
serious adverse events; and concealing clinical trial data showing harm.”89 She further
details her concerns that industry sponsorship of clinical studies can “exert inappropriate
influence in research via control of study data and statistical analysis, ghostwriting,
managing all or most aspects of manuscript preparation, and dictating to investigators the
journals to which they should submit their manuscripts,” noting that some companies are
rumored to be preventing researchers from publishing in JAMA because of its conflictsof-interest requirements.90 DeAngelis’ concerns are shared by many,91 and the behaviors
she identifies are well documented.92 In addition to JAMA’s adventures, the New
England Journal of Medicine dealt with its own controversy with industry-supported
research when it published notices stating that they believed that Merck intentionally
altered the evidence in clinical trials of Vioxx the results of which were published in the
Journal.93
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Conflicts-of-interest analysis, which has framed the debate over industry funding
of clinical trials, can go only so far in responding to the crisis in the reliability, real or
perceived, of clinical research.94 As most critics acknowledge, pharmaceutical industry
support for clinical research has significant benefits, and it is highly unrealistic to think
that patients would be better off without it.95 Furthermore, conflicts-of-interest
regulation has limited usefulness as a tool for controlling for the impact of funding on the
quality of clinical research.
JAMA’s own response to the credibility crisis illustrates some of the limitations
of the conflicts-of-interest response to perceived deficiencies in clinical research. JAMA,
like other medical journals,96 has instituted several policies to handle financial conflicts
of interest related to articles submitted for publication.97 Among those, the requirement
of author disclosure of financial interests and the requirement of independent data
analysis for industry-supported studies illustrate important points in the limitations of
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current responses to financial conflicts of interest in the production of clinical
knowledge.98
JAMA requires that authors disclose financial conflicts of interest related to the
research reported in their submitted article. JAMA began requesting disclosure by
authors in 1985;99 made disclosure mandatory in 1989;100 began publishing author
disclosures in 1990;101 and strengthened its disclosure requirements in 2006,102 in
response to concerns about author non-compliance with the Journal’s prior disclosure
requirements.103
The purpose of publishing financial relationship disclosures, according to the
Journal’s editor in chief, is “so that readers can interpret the article in light of that
information.”104 It is not clear exactly how the reader, even the medically-trained reader,
is to take the disclosed conflict into account in evaluating whether the article should
influence prescribing decisions, however.
A quick look at recent issues of JAMA provides a launching point for a discussion
of how a reader should account for a disclosed relationship between researcher and
sponsor in evaluating the article as a source of information to incorporate in practice. In
a selection of JAMA issues published in 2005 through the August 2, 2006 issue (selecting
every fourth issue published), at least one of the authors for approximately one-third (35
of 106) of articles categorized by the Journal as “Original Contributions” (31 of 90) or
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“Reviews” (4 of 16) disclosed financial relationships.105 Four of the thirty-five instances
of reported relevant financial relationships were by authors of Reviews; i.e., metaanalyses of previously published studies. Reviews are among the most influential articles
in medical journals.106 Because “the essence of reviews and editorials is selection and
interpretation of the literature,” the New England Journal of Medicine refuses to publish
reviews by authors who have a “significant” financial interest relevant to the subject
matter of the review, although NEJM had to relax its prohibition in 2002 because of its
inability to secure reviews of drug therapies under the former standards.107
Five of the twelve Reviews in JAMA for which no author made a financial
disclosure involved review of an issue for which there is no apparent pharmaceutical
connection in treatment or diagnosis while seven Reviews addressed issues with obvious
implication for drug therapies or diagnosis. All four of the Reviews written by authors
who disclosed financial relationships, however, reviewed pharmaceutical interventions.
Thus, of the seven Reviews with apparent pharmaceutical subject matter, more than 50%
were written by authors with disclosable financial relationships. These numbers may
actually under-report the proportion of JAMA articles written by authors with relevant
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financial interests as there have been some reports of authors failing to disclose required
information.108
The editor of JAMA, in an editorial published in the Journal describing
implementation of the Journal’s disclosure policy, argues that all articles in JAMA have
passed “rigorous peer review and careful editorial evaluation.”109 She goes on to say that
the fact that authors of several articles published by JAMA in early 2006 failed to
disclose required information “does not automatically translate to the article being
flawed.”110 Still, “[f]or disclosure to be effective, the recipient of the advice must
understand how the conflict of interest has influenced the advisor and must be able to
correct for that biasing influence.”111
So, how should the practicing physician, or practice guidelines development
panel, take the disclosed financial support into account and “correct for that biasing
influence”? If JAMA, applying its “rigorous peer review” process, and knowing of the
financial interests of the author and the source of sponsorship, has published an article,
what more would the individual practicing physician be able to bring to the critique of the
research? If the practicing physician is simply to be “skeptical,” the advice confirms the
pattern of skepticism about scientific journals discussed earlier.112 If that pattern of
skepticism is to be encouraged, then on what should the physician rely in deciding to
prescribe medications off-label? Experience? Intuition? Peer opinion leaders?
Enlarging the scope just a bit, how should consensus or practice guidelines panels treat
the one-third of JAMA articles that are written by authors with financial self-interest?
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These articles can hardly be eliminated entirely from consideration because they are
likely to be the only source of peer-reviewed data and because they may in fact be valid.
Disclosure does not itself remedy concerns with the quality of clinical
information. Nor has disclosure of conflicts of interest in medicine produced the desired
response in the clinical context. The process of disclosing financial conflicts of interest
may encourage the physician to grant himself or herself a “moral license” to behave
differently once the disclosure has been made.113 In addition, disclosure of conflicts of
interest by the doctor in a therapeutic relationship may actually increase the patient’s trust
level rather than putting them on guard.114 The doctor-reader may behave differently
than patients in this regard, however, as doctors tend to believe that they themselves are
not influenced by their financial interests but that other doctors may be.115
In an additional response to financial conflicts of interest in research, JAMA has
established a special rule for independent statistical analysis for industry-sponsored
studies. In 2005, JAMA established a policy requiring that the authors of industrysponsored studies in which data analysis was done “solely by statisticians employed by
the company sponsoring the research” submit an “independent analysis of the data . . .
conducted by statisticians at an academic institution, such as a medical school, academic
medical center, or government research institute” as a condition for consideration for
publication.116 The preference for biostatisticians working at “academic” institutions
works from an assumption that the place in which the evaluation is conducted makes a
difference. Furthermore, independent, external data analysis is not required of studies
113
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conducted and analyzed in academic institutions working under contract (through a
research grant funding the study) with a for-profit industry sponsor. By implication,
industry sponsorship is less dangerous when the academy is industry’s partner.
In fact, a great deal of clinical research has moved out of the academic medical
centers and into contract research organizations (CROs)117 and private physician offices.
Although estimates of the magnitude of the shift from academic medical centers (AMCs)
to private physician offices or CROs vary, all agree that there has been a landslide in that
direction and that it continues to grow. Only 40% of the funding of clinical trials is
currently being placed with academic medical centers; and 60% is being placed with
private practices, a three-fold increase in ten years. Fewer than half of researchers work
in academic medical centers, representing an 80% decrease over ten years.118 The
number of physicians in private practice who were engaged in protocols tripled to nearly
12,000 physicians between 1990 and 1995.119

Estimates of CRO participation in

pharmaceutical research report an annual growth rate of approximately 20% between
1995 and 2000.120
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Research has become a profit center for the physician in private practice.121 The
sponsor typically pays the doctor in private practice a fee of $2000 to $7000 per patient
enrolled, sometimes with little required beyond the collection of minimal data.122
Enrollment payments by NIH for research in AMCs generally have been somewhat
lower.123 According to a 2000 OIG study, doctors in private practice engaged in
industry-funded studies also tend to receive additional compensation from sponsors in
terms of consulting fees, speakers’ bureaus, and advisory panels.124
It is likely that this trend of moving clinical trials away from academic medical
centers and out to private practices will continue. Post-marketing clinical trials require
very large numbers of patients, and these numbers might be captured more quickly by
paying many private physicians to recruit their own patients rather than by paying an
academic researcher to try to recruit individuals from the general population or from
teaching hospitals.125 Some sponsors believe that the practicing physician researchers and
the contract research organizations will be able to complete clinical trials more quickly
than will an academic medical center because of additional administrative requirements
often found in universities.126 Others have argued that the most effective and informative
clinical trials must be conducted in a great number of physician offices with a wide range
of patients and practitioners with varying skill levels if they are to be useful for medical
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decision making.127 Finally, as is discussed in Part III of this article, funding postapproval studies in private medical offices may serve other non-research marketing
interests for the pharmaceutical firms as well.128
The JAMA policy requiring university or government analyses of data implies
that the academic medical center provides a greater defense against industry behavior that
undermines the reliability of clinical studies.129 The interests of the academic clinician
researcher and the academic medical center, it is thought, will militate against acceptance
of publication agreements that allow the sponsor to suppress or permit publication of
results; will more likely demand valid research design; and will be more likely to produce
accurate data and reliable statistical analyses and interpretation. There may have been an
assumption, for example, that academic researchers would be particularly sensitive to
financial conflicts of interest. In fact, however, compliance with JAMA’s relatively
benign disclosure requirements has proven spotty among academic researchers at very
well-respected research universities.130 Beyond questions of character or
understanding131 that might lie beneath these individual instances of noncompliance,
contemporary circumstances challenge the assumed singularity of interests for the
academic research endeavor.
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Elite research universities and their medical centers rely primarily on NIH
funding to support their research efforts; but even in these institutions, industry-funded
research provides opportunities to grow the discretionary budget by providing a margin
that remains in the control of the department or the researcher rather than the university
fisc.132 AMCs other than the research elite may be losing the competition for the now
shrinking NIH research dollar; and for these academic institutions, pharmaceutical
research contracts are filling the gap.133
In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,134 which unleashed the entrepreneurial
spirit of academic researchers and their employers with the goal of expediting the transfer
of academic research to the market, significantly altered the interests of these researchers
and universities.135 In a 2000 study, 124 of 183 institutions that were members of the
Association of University Technology Managers reported that they held equity interests
in businesses engaged in research at the university.136 Start-up companies, like those
132
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stimulated by Bayh-Dole and often jointly owned by research faculty and their
university-employers, in fact have been associated with delays in publication of study
results and resistance to sharing results,137 mirroring the issues concerning sponsor
control of research discussed above. At a minimum, rules applicable to “industry” should
not be restricted only to large, for-profit pharmaceutical firms, but should also consider
the smaller start-ups owned by research faculty and the universities themselves.
Moreover, the narrow target of the JAMA policy exemplifies another attempt to make the
challenge to clinical research more manageable by drawing boundaries that lack a
grounding in reality.
Industry influence is not the only quality issue affecting the utility of clinical trials
for prescribing decisions. Critics of the current state of clinical research focus on faults
in the selection and design of studies that have little or nothing to do with industry
sponsorship and conflicts of interest. For example, current studies of health outcomes in
clinical trials frequently suffer from two forms of design flaws. First, many clinical
studies rely on observation and self-reporting as the primary tool for evaluating
effectiveness. Although these tools are unavoidable in some circumstances such as
studies evaluating the effectiveness of pain medication, they tend to suffer from bias.138
Second, most clinical trials are not designed with the clinical decision making process in
mind. In order to remedy this latter problem, some have recommended encouraging
“pragmatic” or “practical” clinical trials (PCTs). PCTs are those trials that are targeted
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toward producing information needed to make a decision in practice.139 PCTs must be
designed to respond to clinical decision making. They must “select clinically relevant
interventions to compare, include a diverse population of study participants, recruit
participants from a variety of practice settings, and collect data on a broad range of health
outcomes.”140 Clinical trials that will be effective in informing prescribing decisions
must include patients from high risk populations and must use diagnostic indicators that
are commonly used in practice, which may be less definitive than other more
sophisticated but less available diagnostic tools.141 They must also include patients who
replicate the typical clinical population in terms of history of medication and medical
conditions -- characteristics that are typically treated as excluding factors in clinical
trials.142 In addition, the studies should be designed to compare effectiveness, cost and
safety among available drugs and between medications and non-pharmaceutical
therapies.143 Finally, clinical trials should account for variations in the quality of
physician skills as such variations may have a substantial impact on the effectiveness of
any therapy.144 Removing or regulating conflicts of interest in research will not stimulate
more clinically-useful design.
Furthermore, off-label prescribing and other treatment decisions also confront
serious quantity and timeliness issues in clinical knowledge. Several experts, for
example, have noted that current clinical research endeavors are not producing “an
adequate supply of information to meet the needs of clinicians and health policy
139
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makers.”145 The lack of clinical research effort reduces the effectiveness of clinical
practice guidelines when those guidelines do not include “clear, specific
recommendations,”146 and hampers payers who lack the information necessary to
establish scientifically grounded coverage decisions.147 This insufficiency is certainly not
explained by conflicts of interest.

In fact, restrictions on industry funding of research is

likely to diminish the production of necessary clinical knowledge.148
Widespread concern for the credibility and reliability of clinical research in
pharmaceuticals is apparent, but the solution is not. The conflict-of-interest framework,
especially to the extent that it relies on disclosure, does not effectively respond to the
issue of the quality of particular articles, it merely sets a generic warning flag on the data,
a warning flag that is nonspecific and, in the case of peer-reviewed published studies is
countered by the peer-review “seal of approval.” Counterintuitively, the warning flag
may actually decrease sensitivity to conflicts of interest, by increasing the assumption of
trustworthiness, as such disclosures have in the clinical setting,149 or conversely by
reducing such disclosures to background chatter because of the pervasiveness of industry
support for clinical trials.
Efforts to assure that pharmaceutical firms do not cook the data or the
interpretation of a trial are totally justifiable. Exhorting them to voluntarily select and
fund studies that do not contribute to or that may undermine their competitive position is
probably futile, except in situations where patient safety is at issue. Other options for
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increasing the volume of post-approval clinical research beyond that required for safety
surveillance typically require accounting for the cost of such research somewhere.
Although the conflicts-of-interest tool addresses one aspect of imperfection in
information for prescribing, it does so only roughly. In addition, it does not contribute to
stimulating the conduct of Phase IV trials, and may instead actually depress the
development of post-marketing research. Finally, the conflicts-of-interest approach does
not provide a method for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate
prescribing.
Part III: Through a Glass Darkly: False Claims Act Litigation and Off-Label
Prescribing
Over the past two years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has enjoyed tremendous
success in pursuing False Claims Act actions against pharmaceutical firms relating to offlabel prescribing and post-approval relationships with prescribing physicians.150 Included
among the DOJ’s victories is the settlement of $455 million and guilty plea
by the manufacturer of a single drug, Neurontin.
The Neurontin-style litigation, whether hailed as “the best hope for short-term
reform”151 or condemned as “inefficient” and “overly-aggressive,”152 is most often
viewed as a dramatization of financial conflicts of interest in research and clinical
decision making, fueled by pharmaceutical industry practices relating to prescribing.153 It
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certainly does that. Although never formally resolved by verdict or final judgment,154 the
evidence strongly suggests that Parke-Davis,155 the defendant manufacturer of Neurontin,
had used both educational and research efforts as vehicles to market the drug
aggressively for off-label uses.156
Other insights emerge, however, when the course of the litigation and settlement
are set parallel to contemporaneous and subsequent patterns of off-label prescribing for
Neurontin. Viewed in that context, the difficulties that arise in evaluating whether a
particular off-label prescription is itself actually a “false claim” or in some other fashion
inappropriate come into a sharper focus. Furthermore, the disreputable connotation of
“off-label” as non-scientific or fraudulent is challenged by the subsequent FDA approval
of Neurontin for particular indications that had become quite popular while in their “offlabel” stage and were, in fact, listed among the uses for which prescriptions were false
claims. The discussion of the case, thus, highlights the deficiencies in current forms of
clinical research,157 both in making prescribing decisions and in regulating those
decisions. The case illustrates quite sharply the importance of appreciating the issue of
154

It is unlikely that pharmaceutical defendants in fraud and abuse prosecutions will proceed to trial for a
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off-label prescribing as more than simply an issue of inappropriate financial relationships
in medicine and the challenge of regulating off-label prescribing in light of medical ways
of knowing and learning.
Government regulation of pharmaceutical industry activities in post-approval
marketing and research has been weak.158 Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act restrict,159 but do not entirely prohibit,160 post-approval marketing of approved drugs
for off-label uses. In addition, court decisions concerning the constitutional boundaries
on the authority of the agency to confine commercial speech have hampered aggressive
enforcement of these provisions.161 Furthermore, the FDA largely relies on voluntary
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For a comprehensive overview of laws governing post-approval marketing of off-label uses for
approved drugs, see Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of
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“Exaggerate Its Overall Place in the Universe” When Regulating Speech Incident to “Off-Label”
Prescription Drug Labeling and Advertising, 35 AKRON L. REV. 491, 499 (2002); David M. Fritch, Speak
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compliance with its marketing restrictions and has devoted only limited resources to postapproval marketing surveillance.162 Some have argued that the FDA’s relative inactivity
in this arena is not due to regulatory philosophy or to limitations in resources but rather is
due to the influence of pharmaceutical interests.163 Although some states have enacted
statutes to address issues in the marketing of drugs, these efforts are relatively new and
undeveloped and rely primarily on disclosure mechanisms.164
Federal agencies also regulate post-approval pharmaceutical research efforts
through the mechanisms that govern research with human subjects generally.165 These
regulations, often called the “Common Rule” because they have been promulgated in
similar form by several federal agencies to govern private and public research that arises
in the scope of their work, focus on protecting the individuals who participate as subjects
in research protocols.166 These regulations generally delegate enforcement of the
protective standards to the private research organization or university itself with only a
second front of government oversight that has varied over time in its activity level.
Several of the agencies, including the FDA, that share this “Common Rule” have issued
guidance or regulations concerning financial relationships between researchers and

No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech
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Id. at 253. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-833.01 (2004).
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sponsors, including sponsors of pharmaceutical research.167 Essentially, these conflictsof-interest regulations rely on the same delegation to private research organizations that
characterizes the “Common Rule” generally. The conflicts-of-interest guidance or
regulations require that the research organization have a written policy; that researchers
disclose conflicts of interest to the research organization; that the organization operate an
internal review mechanism; and that the organization manage, reduce or eliminate
conflicts of interest, as appropriate.168 Guidance on conflicts of interest in research from
the Department of Health and Human Services is even more general, and consists mostly
of questions and points that the institution might consider in implementing an internal
conflict of interest policy, while the FDA provides for agency evaluation of financial
interest disclosures.169
In contrast to the limitations imposed upon or adopted by the FDA in regulating
industry-prescriber interactions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services have adopted
an aggressive litigation strategy to regulate industry post-approval marketing and clinical
research funding, especially as these relate to off-label prescribing. In fact, the OIG has
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benefits that outweigh the risks of the studies. To the extent that conflicts of interest may compromise the
validity or usefulness of the results, they may alter the risk-benefit calculus.
168
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identified industry-prescriber relationships as a primary target for enforcement efforts.170
The DOJ and OIG wield an assault weapon in the form of civil and criminal enforcement
of statutes designed to protect the government’s financial interests in public programs,171
such as Medicare and Medicaid, to establish boundaries on post-approval marketing and
funding of research by pharmaceutical firms.172 This high-profile litigation strategy is
currently the primary “regulatory” effort for off-label marketing, industry-funded clinical
trials, and prescribing. The Neurontin litigation discussed in this section is the most
notable episode in this effort.
The FDA approved Neurontin (gabapentin) in 1994 for use as adjunctive therapy
for epilepsy.173 Shortly after its approval, physicians were prescribing Neurontin as a
monotherapy for epilepsy; for pain control for a large number of pain states, including
post-herpetic neuropathy; for bipolar disorder; for attention deficit disorder; for ALS; for
migraine; for restless leg syndrome; for sleep disorders; and for a variety of other uses.
In fact, in 1995, one year after approval of Neurontin, 40% of the prescriptions written
for the medication were for off-label indications.174
The Neurontin litigation began when Dr. David Franklin, a medical liaison
employed by Parke-Davis, filed a qui tam action in 1996. In his lawsuit, Franklin alleged
170
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that Parke-Davis illegally incentivized physicians to write prescriptions for Neurontin
which would be paid for by government medical payment programs, including Medicare,
Medicaid and Veterans’ Administration programs. Franklin argued, among other
theories, that these prescriptions amounted to false claims against the government in
violation of the False Claims Act.
Defendant Parke-Davis filed a motion to dismiss Franklin’s claims on several
grounds. The firm argued that the firm itself filed no false claims as the doctors who
prescribed the drug, and thus caused the government programs to make payment, were an
“intervening force.” It also argued that the False Claims Act could not be used to
enforce the FDA’s restrictions on promotion of approved drugs for off-label uses. The
court rejected each of these arguments as they applied to the relator’s claims concerning
prescriptions for Neurontin paid for by the Medicare and Medicaid programs.175
Parke-Davis argued that it had not filed a single claim for reimbursement from
any governmental entity for prescriptions for Neurontin. It argued that, because only
physicians can prescribe, it was only the physicians who had filed a claim, whether false
or not.176 The doctors, according to Parke-Davis, were an “intervening force” and as
such the necessary causal link between its own behavior and the false claims was
missing. According to the court, however, the doctors’ actions were foreseeable and
175
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were, in fact, the “intended consequence of the alleged scheme of fraud,”satisfying the
requirement of causation.177
The court also rejected Parke-Davis’ argument that the False Claims Act could
not be used to enforce the provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act concerning
promotion of off-label uses. The court rejected this argument holding that the violation
of the FDCA could be pursued under the False Claims Act if the violation of the FDCA
“amounts to a material misrepresentation made to obtain a government benefit.”178 In
the view of the court, the False Claims Act simply provided tools not available to the
FDA, including civil money damages and private enforcement, for the enforcement of its
restrictions on promotion of off-label uses.179
The court contended with two central issues in applying false claims standards to
Parke-Davis’ marketing efforts. First, while particular activities, such as discussing offlabel uses without an initial physician inquiry, may formally violate the FDCA
restrictions on marketing, can those communications properly be considered false claims
unless the representations themselves are inaccurate or false? Second, if the nonapproved indications for which the drug is marketed and prescribed are legitimate uses
covered by the federal payment program, can they be false claims by virtue of their status
as off-label or by the very fact that the firm had marketed these off-label uses to doctors?
The court rejected the firm’s argument in its motion to dismiss that off-label
promotions, even when in violation of the FDCA, are not per se false statements within
the meaning of the False Claims Act. The court rejected this argument, apparently
relying on the relator’s claims in this particular case that the firm knowingly made false
177
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statements about the drug’s performance.180 The court in this opinion, however, stated
that “[a] much closer question would be presented if the allegations involved only the
unlawful – yet truthful – promotion of off-label uses . . .”.181
In considering Parke-Davis’ later submission of a motion for summary judgment,
however, the court revisited the issue of whether truthful information provided to
physicians, but still an illegal promotion under the FDCA, could form the root of a false
claim for prescribing.. In this later unpublished opinion, the court concluded that
defendant’s “non-fraudulent” promotion of Neurontin for off-label uses could, indeed,
result in a false claim, but only if the Medicaid program did not cover the off-label uses at
issue.182 Thus, there would be no false claim, in the case of non-fraudulent promotional
efforts that nonetheless violated the FDCA, if the state Medicaid program covered the
specific off-label prescriptions at issue.183
According to the court’s opinion ruling on the firm’s motion to dismiss, ParkeDavis did not “dispute that an off-label prescription submitted for reimbursement by
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however. See supra note 154.
181

49

Medicaid is a false claim” in its motion to dismiss the qui tam action.184 Even though
Parke-Davis apparently did not dispute this proposition at that point in this litigation, it is
not an accurate statement of the law. It is well-established that Medicaid programs must
cover off-label prescriptions under certain circumstances.185 Under the Medicaid
program, prescription drugs are not covered if the drugs are prescribed “for a medical
indication which is not a medically accepted indication.”186 An off-label or unapproved
use, however, can be a “medically accepted indication” under the Medicaid statute if the
off-label indication is included in one of the drug compendia listed in the federal
statute.187 The court in its opinion denying the motion to dismiss states that none of the
off-label uses at issue in the litigation were listed in any of the compendia during the time
covered by the lawsuit.188 In its later opinion denying Parke-Davis’ subsequent motion
for summary judgment, however, the District Court further studied the question of
whether the off-label uses of Neurontin were covered by Medicaid, at this point viewed
by the court as a key question in whether a False Claims Act action for promotion of offlabel uses would survive. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that
forty-two state Medicaid programs covered “off-label, non-compendium”
prescriptions.189 While the court does not resolve whether states, in fact, have such
latitude under the federal Medicaid statute, it concludes that at least eight states did not
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provide coverage for off-label, non-compendium prescriptions and that, at least as to
those states, the False Claims Act claims could survive. The court holds that the
defendant’s argument thus goes to the amount of damages rather than to whether there
are sufficient facts to support a claim.190
The Department of Justice, which had monitored the Neurontin litigation from its
filing by the private relator,191 took an active role in the litigation after the District
Court’s rulings denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary
judgment.192 Once it entered the case, the DOJ resurrected the allegation of false claims
against the Veterans Administration,193 which had been dismissed by the trial judge. In
addition, state attorneys general joined the action to file claims to recover the payments
made by their states under the federal-state Medicaid program as well as claims under
state consumer protection statutes.194
The DOJ characterized Parke-Davis’s actions as “a widespread, coordinated
national effort to implement an off-label marketing plan.”195 As is often the case in qui
tam litigation, internal communications provided the interpretive framework or narrative
for the government’s suit. First, a Parke-Davis marketing executive allegedly told the
company’s medical liaisons that the FDA-approved use for Neurontin “is not where the
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money is. I want you out there every day selling Neurontin” for off-label uses.196 In
addition, an advertising firm working for the company produced a report entitled “1998
Neurontin Tactics” which recommended that the company hold educational programs on
the use of Neurontin for bi-polar disorder and other off-label uses of the drug.197
Particular educational/marketing activities alleged by DOJ to be illegal included
encouraging sales representatives to pitch off-label use without a prior inquiry from the
physician in violation of FDA standards for post-approval marketing.198 The Department
also challenged the company’s sponsorship of continuing medical education. ParkeDavis sponsored “independent medical education” events, as do most pharmaceutical
companies. In this case, however, DOJ alleged that Parke-Davis as sponsor selected the
topics, speakers, and content of the programs and planted questions from the floor to
assure that the drug would be showcased as it desired. In addition, Parke-Davis
conducted teleconferences in which physicians discussed their experience in prescribing
Neurontin for off-label uses, with the company paying physician-speakers as well as
paying doctors enrolled in the teleconference for their time.199 The DOJ further alleged
that Parke-Davis representatives made misleading statements about efficacy of the drug
for particular purposes.200
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The evidence, as presented by the relator and DOJ, also indicates that the firm’s
funding of post-approval clinical research on off-label uses for Neurontin also was a part
of the marketing effort. The government and the relator alleged that doctors participating
in study protocols for Neurontin received substantial payments for enrolling their patients
in the protocol while having minimal obligations for data collection or analysis.201 In
addition, the clinical trials often were open label (where doctor and patient were aware of
which drug was being used) a study design generally viewed as inferior to random
controlled trials especially where measures of improvement rely on patient self-reporting.
The OIG had specifically expressed concerns about these and similar structural practices
in post-marketing clinical research in a 1994 Fraud Alert.202 Finally, Parke-Davis
originated the grants and protocols in their marketing department rather than in their
research department, a practice that the government identified as “suspect activity” in
OIG guidance issued after the initiation of the lawsuit but before the settlement.203
In 2004, Parke-Davis entered into a settlement with the federal and state
governments. Parke-Davis paid $152 million plus interest to reimburse both the federal
($83.6 million) and the state ($68.4 million) governments for off-label prescriptions for
Neurontin paid for by the state-federal Medicaid program. The company also settled
state consumer protection claims for $38 million plus interest. The company also
accepted a mandatory corporate compliance program. Finally, the firm pled guilty to the
charge that some of its post-approval communications with physicians violated the
restrictions of the FDCA and, therefore, violated the False Claims Act. Parke-Davis paid
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a criminal fine of $240 million for this violation. The qui tam relator recovered an
additional $24.64 million from the firm as part of the settlement as well.204
In all, Parke-Davis paid over $455 million, the largest settlement for such
litigation to that date.205 The settlement also spawned several subsequent class action
lawsuits against Parke-Davis by private insurers, including Aetna and the Teamsters, and
by self-insured employers to recover what the insurance plans had paid for off-label
prescriptions for Neurontin206 as well as products liability and consumer protection
claims by patients themselves.207
The DOJ and Parke-Davis disagreed over whether the firm’s activities fell within
the ambit of the False Claims Act both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact. DOJ,
however, produced significant evidence that the firm’s activities crossed over into suspect
practices, including practices that the government had identified earlier as potential fraud;
and Parke-Davis admitted to certain violations and paid the largest settlement to date for
a pharmaceutical case that did not involve pricing or kickback issues, perhaps in part
because of the overwhelming risk of exclusion from the Medicare program if the DOJ
succeeded in proving its case in court.208
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The “rest of the story” in this instance, however, does not lie in deciding whether
the Department’s narrative or the defendant’s counter story about the company’s
behavior is true, but rather in what was happening to Neurontin prescribing during the
course of the litigation and thereafter. In 2002, 94% of Neurontin prescriptions were for
off-label indications, up from 40% in 1995.209 Neurontin sales amounted to $2.7 billion
in 2003, of which nearly $2.5 billion was for off-label uses.210
One might expect that Neurontin prescribing patterns would change as physicians
learned of the government’s high-profile attack on off-label prescribing of Neurontin and
allegations of misleading marketing, but that is not the case. In August, 2004, two years
into the state and federal governments’ pursuit of the lawsuit and shortly after the
attention-grabbing settlement, sales of Neurontin had actually increased by 32% over the
same quarter the year before.211 Lehman Brothers estimated that the great bulk of those
prescriptions for Neurotin -- 90% of sales, in fact -- were still for off-label uses.212 In
fact, only in 2006, did another medication surpass sales of Neurontin for neuropathic
pain, which was an off-label use for Neurontin during the course of the litigation until its
approval by the FDA (only as to cases in which neuropathic pain is associated with
shingles) in 2002; and this was due to the expiration of its patent protection and the
resultant entry of generics.213
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The persistence of off-label prescribing for Neurontin even after the eye-popping
settlement and guilty plea in this case, could be attributed to the observed persistence of
prescribing habits in physicians described earlier.214 In other words, once brand loyalty
has been purchased, it continues even after the flow of money and perquisites stops.
In this case, however, some of the off-label prescribing of Neurontin actually was
good medicine despite the fact that at the time no rigorous clinical studies supported the
uses for which practicing doctors were prescribing the medication. Off-label prescribing
decisions, even though stimulated by pharmaceutical detailing, may be justified and may
provide essential care for patients. Apparently, this was the case with the off-label use of
Neurontin for relief of neuropathic pain.
Neuropathic pain is one of the most treatment-resistant pain conditions that exist.
Such pain is chronic and debilitating and does not respond to more common pain
medications, including opioids.215 It is not surprising that doctors trying to treat patients
with neuropathic pain, and the patients themselves, would be willing to try innovative
therapies to get some relief. So it happened that doctors began to use Neurontin for
neuropathic pain despite the fact that no rigorous clinical studies supported its use for that
purpose. Patients experienced relief with Neurontin, and Parke-Davis apparently spread
the word to its own benefit, but also to the benefit of patients in pain. In 2002, the FDA
formally approved Neurontin for the treatment of post-herpetic neuropathic pain, i.e.,
nerve pain associated with shingles,216 in the midst of the Neurontin prosecution.
Neurontin has not been approved for the treatment of neuropathic pain caused by other
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disease states, and it won’t be. Nor is the drug likely to be subjected to double-blind,
random-controlled clinical trials in persons suffering neuralgia from other conditions as
the patent for the drug has expired and generics are taking control of the market.217 The
absence of clinical trials does not mean that Neurontin (now generic gabapentin) is not
effective in treating these highly similar pain states just as FDA approval in 2002 didn’t
make the drug effective for treating pain. Nor was the experience of doctors and patients
who observed the pain relieving effect of Neurontin “false” even though it would be
categorized as “anecdotal.”
The Neurontin litigation was not solely focused on the use of Neurontin for
neuropathic pain, of course. The Justice Department specifically referenced the
promotion of the drug for bipolar disorder, ALS, attention deficit disorder, migraine,
withdrawal seizures, and restless leg syndrome in addition to “various pain states” in its
statements describing the settlement, for example.218 Certainly, Neurontin may not be
effective in treating all of these disorders; and surely it is distinctly possible that ParkeDavis representatives exaggerated the evidence regarding these uses. The now-proven
effectiveness of Neurontin for neuropathic pain (but only that related to shingles)
illustrates one of the challenges in establishing that inappropriate marketing causes
inappropriate and ineffective prescribing.
Nearly one-third of the amount paid by Parke-Davis ($152 million plus interest)
was paid to the state and federal governments as reimbursement for payments made for
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off-label prescriptions of Neurontin for Medicaid beneficiaries.219 This payment signals
that the government (as purchaser for the program’s beneficiaries) did not get what it paid
for when it paid for off-label prescriptions of this drug. Parke-Davis was accused, for
example, of “steal[ing] from taxpayers” when it promoted off-label uses of Neurontin.220
After the settlement, however, Neurontin continued to be the third highest drug cost for
some state Medicaid programs.221
It would be reasonable for state Medicaid programs to turn the False Claims Act
litigation, essentially a damning autopsy of the firm’s behavior, into prospective payment
regulation. Even a year after the settlement produced “re-payments” to the Medicaid
programs for prescriptions written prior to the date of settlement, however, state
Medicaid programs continued to pay for off-label use of Neurontin without any
significant change in payment standards.222 If Parke-Davis was required to repay the
Medicaid program for the off-label prescribing it stimulated, because these prescriptions
amounted to false claims, then why would the state continue to pay for those same
prescriptions after the date of the settlement? The State of Florida decided it would not
do so.
In 2004, “following news reports that Neurontin was being widely prescribed for
off-label uses and that reimbursement for the drug by state Medicaid programs was
significant,” the Florida legislature acted to encourage the state Medicaid agency to
constrain reimbursement for off-label prescriptions of Neurontin.223 The legislation
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specifically authorized the agency to implement a prior authorization program for “offlabel uses of Medicaid-covered prescribed drugs” that would require doctors “to provide
information about the rational and supporting medical evidence for the off-label use of
the drug.”224
In July, 2004, the Florida Medicaid agency established a policy under which it
would pay for Neurontin only for its approved uses (adjunctive therapy for epileptic
seizures225 and neuropathic pain associated with shingles) and for off-label uses “only
when safety and efficacy were proven by double-blind, placebo controlled, randomized
clinical trials.”226 However, the agency decided to reimburse for two unapproved
indications for which there were no clinical studies proving the drug effective. These two
uses were the prescription of Neurontin for ALS, for which the FDA had formally
categorized Neurontin as an “orphan drug,”227 and for diabetic peripheral neuropathy.228
Thus, the agency refused to pay for prescriptions of Neurontin for any uses other than
adjunctive therapy for epileptic seizures and partial refractory seizures; for post-herpetic
neuropathic pain and diabetic peripheral neuropathy; and for ALS. It excluded, for
example, prescriptions for Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic pain unless the
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patient had shingles or diabetes. Patients with neuropathic pain from medical conditions
other than shingles or diabetes filed suit.229
Florida claimed that its coverage decisions for Neurontin complied with the
federal Medicaid requirement that the state cover off-label uses that are “supported by
one or more citations”230 in the accepted drug compendia.231 The American Hospital
Formulary Service Drug Informant (AHFS) listed several off-label uses for Neurontin,
including its use for neuropathic and neurogenic pain resulting from a variety of medical
conditions, but did not provide any citations to studies or journal articles for any of these
uses.232 Another of the approved compendia, DRUGDEX, listed fifty-four uses for
Neurontin. DRUGDEX classified each use as “effective, possibly effective, or
ineffective” and rated the available documentation of effectiveness as “excellent, good,
fair, and poor.”233 All but three of the fifty-four uses listed in this publication were
recognized as either “effective” or “possibly effective.” Of the three uses categorized in
DRUGDEX as “ineffective,” Florida’s Medicaid program actually covered two: ALS and
a specific manifestation of epilepsy.234
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The District Court held that the Florida agency’s policy violated the coverage
mandated in the federal Medicaid program. The court recognized that the state could
have followed other routes within its authority under the federal Medicaid statute to
control Medicaid payments for Neurontin prescriptions, which would have required caseby-case review for individual patients,235 but that the method used by the state violated
the statutory mandate.
In particular, the court noted that the state’s requirement that an off-label use
would be covered only if it were supported by “double-blind, placebo-controlled
randomized clinical trials” misinterpreted the statute as “this is the same standard
employed for FDA-approved uses” and it “is the equivalent of saying the same thing
twice.”236 The court said further:
If Congress had intended that “medically accepted indications” must be supported
by double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials, it would have said
so. . . [Amendments of the statutory provision at issue] over the years substantiate
the notion that Congress intended coverage for off-label uses, many of which
would obviously not be supported by the same strict criteria required for FDA
approval.237
The core of the injury alleged and recovered for in the Neurontin litigation was
that inappropriate marketing corrupted medical decision making with the result that the
states paid for unnecessary or ineffective product.238 Prescription of Neurontin for
certain unapproved uses (for example, for neuropathic pain) did not injure the states in
this fashion. In fact, Medicaid patients receiving the drug for those purposes received
effective and necessary treatment even if the prescription was off-label, and even if their
doctors learned of this use through firm-sponsored marketing. Although the FDA has not
235

See supra note 231.
Edmonds, 447 F.Supp.2d at 1337.
237
Id.
238
See supra note 220.
236

61

approved Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic pain generated by diseases or
injuries other than shingles, it seems entirely reasonable for physicians to believe that the
drug may be effective for those pain states as well, especially if patients are reporting
positive results.
It was also logical for the Florida Medicaid agency to address the forward flow of
dollars after the Neurontin settlement. Although the agency was thwarted in this effort
by the federal Medicaid statute, its experience is more generalizable. Requiring the
completion of “double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials” as a
prerequisite for covering prescriptions for medications for unapproved uses appeals to the
notion of medicine as science, but would have prevented patients in some cases from
receiving the only effective care available.239
Private insurers have fared no better than the State of Florida in their attempts to
control individual off-label prescribing decisions, and their challenges have nothing to do
with the Medicaid statute. The hesitancy of private payers to involve themselves in
reining in off-label prescribing may be a simple matter of administrative convenience. If
their primary concern is to control drug costs, there are less expensive methods for doing
so. These include shifting costs to consumers through co-pays, tiered benefit systems,
prior authorization requirements, and step therapy (“fail first”) mechanisms.240 These are
hardly satisfactory as methods for evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of an
off-label or any prescription for that matter because they erect barriers unrelated to the
effectiveness of medications.
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There are, of course, emerging efforts to constrain prescribing, especially offlabel prescribing, within a rubric of effectiveness and quality rather than cost control.
These efforts face several significant obstacles discussed in this paper. First, these efforts
must address directly the inadequate quantity and quality of post-approval research on
approved drugs and the resulting deficiencies in clinical guidelines. Public funding for
such trials is simply inadequate; private funding by pharmaceutical firms has been made
suspect; incentives for private funding by private insurers are limited when they can
achieve their cost-containment goals through much less expensive means; and incentives
for the insurers to share the knowledge they produce on other than a proprietary basis are
nearly nonexistent. Moreover, if private insurers and pharmacy benefit managers begin
to provide serious funding for clinical trials, who is to say that this funding also won’t be
viewed as suspect for the same reasons of self-serving interests that are now recited for
pharmaceutical funding? Second, even if a robust program of Phase IV clinical trials of
expanded uses for approved drugs does emerge, there will still be the irreducible clinical
uncertainties – uncertainties caused by unavoidable temporal gaps between the
immediacy of clinical decision making and the slow clock required for trials to be
conceived, designed, and executed as well as uncertainties caused by the performance of
the drug on individual patients.
V. Conclusion
We can view the Neurontin litigation as catching a bad actor. Certainly, the
evidence of Parke-Davis’ marketing, educational and research practices provides
sufficient support for that view. With that perspective, the litigation simply dramatizes
the conflicts-of- interest narrative of pharmaceutical firm-prescriber co-dependencies.
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The litigation, the persistence of off-label prescribing post-litigation, and the
difficulties encountered in translating the recovery of Medicaid payments into
prospective controls raise broader issues than those that will fit under the conflicts-ofinterest umbrella, however. Conflicts-of-interest regulation, both public and private,
works only at the margins of the issues raised in this situation. While conflicts-of-interest
surveillance and management may produce some benefits, this approach can also give a
false sense of problem solved even though those interventions do not reach the core
issues of the production and dissemination of clinical knowledge. Conflicts-of-interest
restrictions may remove one source generating increased distrust of the research
enterprise, even though this distrust may be misplaced. Conflicts-of-interest restrictions
won’t fund post-marketing research, and may actually reduce current resources if the
risks of industry funding of post-approval trials include criminal and civil prosecution;
won’t improve physician learning, and appears to be reducing educational opportunities
as firms react to increased risks; and won’t fill the knowledge voids within which both
doctors and regulators currently practice.
Even if the financial relationships between prescribing doctors and Parke-Davis
were inappropriate and perhaps illegal, the existence of those relationships did not prove
that the off-label prescriptions were themselves inappropriate. Off-label prescribing,
even where clinical trials proving efficacy for new indications have not yet begun or are
not yet completed, can bring great benefit to patients. Of course, such prescribing can
also subject patients to ineffective medications with the attendant costs and risks. The
real challenge isn’t detecting and prosecuting the zealous marketing efforts of a ParkeDavis, but rather it is assuring that patients get good care. Raising the risks for
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pharmaceutical firms in funding Phase IV clinical trials and continuing medical education
won’t get us there. Nor will targeting off-label prescribing as if there were no risks in
doing so.
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